Baltimore Red Line Underground

Did they fudge it?

MTA uses math tricks to fudge the federal formula.

Governor O’Malley completed the state’s expected pantomime Tuesday, choosing the $1.6 billion-plus Red Line Alternative 4C as the Locally Preferred Alternative (LPA). It was chosen partially because it’s the most “viable,” meaning that it’s closest to meeting preferred cost standards for Federal money. Their numbers have improved 24% since than the last time the project was formally evaluated.

But you have to wonder – what did the MTA do to 4C to approach that preferred standard?

One way was to cut corners on the project. Making a single-track “Death Trap tunnel” under Cooks Lane is reckoned to save perhaps $70 million. But single tracking is an option the MTA rejected before because it causes, in their own words, “Longer travel times – this is due to the need to wait for trains in the opposing direction; Less frequent service – resulting in a less convenient, attractive service; Lower passenger capacity due to less frequent service, not allowing for future ridership growth, and overall operational and maintenance flexibility.”

What all that means is that the system is less reliable and slower. The end-to-end travel time has now increased to a sluggish 44 minutes, an average speed of 19mph.

Another way is to make the numbers is to cook the books. One way to reduce the cost per rider is to increase the estimated number of riders, which is exactly what the MTA has done.

The MTA Deputy Administrator Henry Kay claimed the mathematical model for determining the number of riders had been refined. Had it ever. Suddenly ridership estimates increased from 42,190 to 54,000, a jump up of 28 percent. To date, the MTA has offered no explanation for this sudden rush of commuters.

Finally, you can rig the numbers by underestimating the costs. Two years ago the estimated cost of the Red Line was $1.8 to $2 billion. Then, after so called refinement of the mathematical model, estimates were lowered to $1.6 billion. Now, after making cuts and adjustments the cost is still $1.6 billion. How reliable can any of these numbers be?

Of course, there is also an option of actually cutting costs in a sensible way, and there are some real opportunities there. For instance, there are to be stations at both Harbor East and Fells point, a literal 5-minute walk apart.

Combing those two stations at a mid point would make sense and save at least $50 million, provided developers can do without doorstep service.

Instead, the MTA eliminated the unwanted SSA West Station, a good move, but a comparatively small savings. It also cut the University of Maryland’s underground station.

The fact is this system design has too little to do with transit, and too much to do with politics. It is designed to benefit potential development on anointed turf – at the expense of the pioneering homeowners who reclaimed the neighborhoods and made them worthy of anointing.

The silver lining for proponents of sensible mass transit may be that may be that these ridiculous changes to “4C” make it easy for Federal Agencies to see that they are being gamed. That this project as presented can’t be the success that the state claims. For more technical details on the MTA’s Double Take on Single Track and how they fudged the numbers, check out this article at Maryland Politics Watch.

Then Baltimore might be able to put forth a real project—a well-connected, fast rail system, operating in an exclusive right-of-way with minimal harm to traffic and the neighborhoods that make Baltimore great.